Wednesday 10 February 2021

How you can lose money to scammers even if you are not trying

 

It is a few years ago now and some of the people concerned caught and prosecuted, so here is a story about identity theft and fraud which happened to me.  It  is a long story, so bear with me.  I think it will frighten you and has the advantage of being true.

How it all started

For a few weeks a number of odd things had happened.  I received two new bank cards and a new PIN  which I hadn’t asked for.  I’d also some couple of telephone calls which just cut off and one apparently from the bank - they put the phone down when my wife answered.  Then, late on a Friday afternoon, I had a call, again purporting to be from the bank, which made me very suspicious.  They clearly had some details about me and about the new card I’d requested (I hadn’t), so, just to be on the safe side, I called the bank and asked for a stop on all my cards.  Luckily, as it turns out, I got a confirmatory text from the bank almost immediately and I kept a screenshot of that as well.  The bank asked me to call in on Monday (the local branch was closed on Saturday) and arrange for a new card.

Something odd also happened over the weekend which I didn’t think too much about at the time – my mobile phone stopped working.  All it meant was two calls to make on the Monday before work – first to the bank then to the phone company.

Waited half an hour (of course) to see somebody in the bank as I didn’t have an appointment.  But, it was important:  I wanted a new working bank card. Eventually I saw a member of staff, who checked my passport and address ID, then told me that I had already gone into another branch in North London (I live in South London) on Saturday (hello, what’s happening here?) and had the cards re-activated or new cards issued, I never found out exactly which.

Large alarm bells ringing, now.  They checked my main account – lots of large transactions for jewellery from West End stores had been made over the weekend.  But, said the staff member, after a few internal telephone calls, we checked with you over the telephone because they were such large transactions and you confirmed it was all OK.  (Now I think I understand why my mobile stopped working). 

Put a stop on everything again, I said, and I’ll be back.  Off to the phone shop now.  After a lot of checking  they told me that I had gone in to a branch on Saturday and convinced them that my phone was lost and I needed a new phone and SIM on my old number.   That so explained that.  Very worried now, I went back to the bank.  There was clearly some very good social engineering going on here coupled with, I could only assume, fake ID in my name.  “No problem”, said the bank, “call in on Wednesday and we’ll have a member of our fraud team here to work it out”.

“It’s all sorted out”

Two anxious days later, I called into the bank.  No fraud team there.  “It’s all sorted out,” they said, “Your wife called and explained that she had made the transactions on your card.”  What?  We have separate accounts and she is not a signatory to my account.  Plus the fact that you put a stop on the cards and you told me on Monday that I had been shopping.  “Did you give her your PIN?”, they said.  “No I did not.  Nor did she go into the West End on Saturday.”  My wife, when I told her, was outraged.  Not only had I been impersonated in person, she had now been impersonated on the phone!


Whilst in the bank, we looked at my accounts again.  Since the bank had unlocked my account again, my current account had now been entirely cleared out.   Money had also been transferred from my other accounts into my current account and taken out of that.  Worse (if it can get worse) they had got into two other community accounts with which I was associated and withdrawing money from there by transferring that into my current account.  On one of those accounts, I had read only access and was not a signatory; on the other I was a signatory but only jointly with a second party and telephone/online banking had not been implemented.  I still do not know how this was done … but it was. 

Now I had no bank cards and no cash, and some difficult explanatory calls to make.  One of the two community organisations had wages to pay and no money now either; so I borrowed some money to re-imburse them, allowing them to do that, and a bit more for myself.  And then settled down to three months of letters, meetings, and statements to the police.

Why me?

The bank eventually refunded everything – we were talking six figure sums – they really didn’t have much of a defence having clearly been conned into disobeying my stop instructions twice.  However an additional £50 compensation for the weeks of inconvenience caused was just a little bit mean.

Some time after it was all over, the police came back and took another statement as they had (I think from what they implied) tracked the gang down.  I learnt a bit more about the methods involved.  It looks as if, a while before it all started, my card was cloned: I think I can now guess where.  After various attempts to get my PIN (hence the duplicate cards and the telephone calls) they decided on the fake identity route.

“Why me?“ I asked the police.  Apparently professional people, particularly if also company directors, are good targets.  They are likely to be moderately wealthy and therefore worth putting in a bit of effort for and there is likely to be quite a bit of information about them on line.  If your name is “John Smith”, you are probably safe as it is difficult to identify which John Smith you might be simply from the name on the card – but if you have an unusual name (and Malcolm Bacchus is an unusual name) it is much easier for fraudsters to find out sufficient information about you to produce at least some credible faked documentation.

What lessons were there?

So that it’s it.  Clearly it is impossible for an individual to prevent fraud on their bank accounts when the bank’s processes are at fault and I am assured by the bank that their processes are tighter now than when this happened.  Companies House too have stopped putting your full date of birth for all to see. But what can one learn from this?  Obviously there are the all normal things such as not giving out your PIN, not writing passwords down, being alert for suspicious telephone calls and not clicking on any unknown links on your computer, but I was fine on all of these and still got caught.  So here are my additional take-aways from the story:

  • Split your funds across accounts with more than one bank
  • If possible, don’t allow your bank to associate the various accounts you might have access to on their system in one place – it’s good for them but good for fraudsters too
  • Again, if possible, and most of the time it isn’t, be careful about who you give copies of your ID to (everybody asks for them these days and whether they store them safely is anybody’s guess)
  • Use invented answers to the security questions on all websites  – not your real first school or first pet (it didn’t happen in my case as far as I am aware, but I was warned that fraudsters are good at extracting that sort of information by social engineering
  • For the same reason, don’t use the same answers or the same passwords on multiple sites
  • Investigate anything odd on your account as soon as it happens: don’t assume it is a mistake
  • Keep documentation on every contact with your bank, even if it was a short telephone call.

And what to do if it happens to you...

Obviously, always contact the bank as soon as you are suspicious.


If you are an ICAEW accountant you can get guidance for you or your clients on the New ICAEW Fraud Advisory Helpline on 01908 248 250; if you are a business speak to your accountant;  and, whether it was you or your business affected, always report the fraud to ActionFraud at actionfraud.police.uk or
0300 123 2040 (England and Wales only – otherwise your local fraud prevention organisation or the police). 

If you are an accountant you might also have to report on a SAT to the National Crime Agency and, as a business or accountant, for cyber crime, to the Information Commissioner’s office.

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